The reading material for class this week was quite diverse! The most interesting piece assigned, in my opinion, was the excerpt from the report written by Stan Deetz (“PUBLICATION 1F HOF LL_V12”). This report focuses on how Executive and Senior managers within the “overall nuclear system” can implement the actions and guidance provided by the Human and Organizational Factors (HOF) following analysis of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. The reason that I found this report to be the most interesting reading this week is its audience. The report discusses how all stakeholders (regulators, local and central governments, media, nuclear plant operators, etc.) slowly and unintentionally came to believe that the nuclear power plants were sufficiently robust and able to withstand much abuse before a catastrophic failure. As it turns out, this unfounded faith in the nuclear power plants robustness ended up being their downfall.
I believe that while analysis such as this report are very necessary in order to avoid repeating mistakes. However, accidents such as the one at Fukushima make me wonder if there is a way to effectively do this analysis before a disaster occurs. I think analyzing the short-comings (for lack of a better word) of infrastructure upon building would help avoid major damage due to natural disasters, however it would seem like an extraneous step while in the moment. It would also be costly and point out the weaknesses of brand new infrastructure, which could be seen as negative and undermining.
Question: How can a system’s analysis allow for an effective risk assessment of new infrastructure?
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